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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Faron Raymond Hawkins appeals from the amended judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of two counts of robbery. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The relevant facts and proceedings were partially set forth by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 305 P.3d 513 (2013), as 
follows: 
In January 2008, a jury convicted Faron Hawkins of two 
counts of robbery. He appealed his conviction and the Idaho Court 
of Appeals issued a decision on December 30, 2009, vacating the 
conviction and remanding the matter for a new trial. The Court of 
Appeals determined that the district court erred by not having 
Hawkins undergo a mental health evaluation during his jury trial to 
determine whether or not he was competent to proceed. 
Specifically, the Court of Appeals stated: 
Taking into account all of the indicia of bizarre 
notions demonstrated before trial started, there was 
enough evidence in this case to put the district court 
on notice that Hawkins' competence was in question. 
Even if the pretrial conduct was insufficient to call for 
a competency evaluation, certainly Hawkins' 
testimony during the trial presented compelling indicia 
that he was not in touch with reality. When taking the 
entire record into account, the district court should 
have entertained a reasonable doubt about Hawkins' 
mental competency either to stand trial or to 
represent himself. Therefore, the district court's 
failure to sua sponte order a mental evaluation and 
make a determination as to Hawkins' competency 
was an abuse of discretion. 
Because it is not possible to retroactively make 
a determination as to Hawkins' competency at the 
time he was tried, we must vacate the judgment of 
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conviction and leave the state free to retry Hawkins if 
he is found to be competent to stand trial. 
State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 782-83, 229 P.3d 379, 387-88 
(Ct. App. 2009). 
On remand, the district court ordered Hawkins to undergo a 
competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-211 and 18-212. 
Licensed psychologist Dr. Chad Sombke and licensed psychiatrist 
Dr. Michael Estess evaluated Hawkins and testified that based on 
their interactions with him, his responses to testing, and information 
regarding his social and institutional history, Hawkins was 
competent to stand trial. Dr. Estess was a consulting psychiatrist 
for the Ada County Jail and had a clinic there with three masters-
level social workers on staff throughout the two-year period 
Hawkins was incarcerated at the Ada County Jail. Dr. Estess 
testified that he interacted with Hawkins individually during this time 
period on several occasions and also spoke often with social 
workers and jail staff who had more frequent contact with him. 
Between 2006 and 2008, neither he nor his staff believed that 
Hawkins suffered from any mental illness. Dr. Estess testified at 
Hawkins' 2010 competency hearing that, based on the documents 
he reviewed, the interviews he conducted, and his interactions and 
his staff's interactions with Hawkins prior to trial, he believed 
Hawkins was "perfectly competent to understand the nature of the 
proceedings, to confer with an attorney in his own defense and 
understand what was going on" at the time he was tried in January 
2008. It is unclear whether the Court of Appeals knew of Dr. 
Estess's interactions with Hawkins when it reviewed his appeal 
from his 2008 conviction. Based on the totality of the evidence 
presented to it, "including admitted exhibits and testimony 
presented during the competency hearing," the district court found 
that Hawkins was both presently competent to stand trial and had 
been competent to stand trial in January 2008. However, the court 
found that the law of the case required it to retry the case. 
Hawkins, 155 Idaho at 70-71, 305 P.3d at 514-15. 
The state sought and received permission to file an interlocutory appeal 
from the district court's December 6, 2010 Order Regarding Defendant's 
Competence, which granted Hawkins a new trial. (#38532 R., pp.243-52, 272-
76, 373); Hawkins, 155 Idaho at 71, 305 P.3d at 515. On appeal, the state 
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argued the Court of Appeals' concluding statement in Hawkins' prior appeal -
that "it is not possible to retroactively make a determination as to Hawkins' 
competency at the time he was tried" and "the state [is] free to retry Hawkins if 
he is found to be competent to stand trial" - was merely dictum and not law of 
the case that prevented the district court from making a retroactive determination 
that Hawkins was competent when he was tried in 2008. (#38532 Appellant's 
brief, pp.6-16; Appellant's reply brief, pp.10-15); Hawkins, 155 Idaho at 72, 305 
P.3d at 516. The Idaho Supreme Court agreed and held "the language in 
Hawkins regarding a retroactive competency determination and the State being 
free to retry Hawkins if he is found presently competent, is not the law of the 
case." Hawkins, 155 Idaho at 73, 305 P.3d at 517. Concluding that "[n]either 
the law of the case doctrine nor I.AR. 38 prevents the district court from making 
a retroactive competency determination as to Hawkins in this case," the Court 
"reverse[d] the decision of the district court and remand[ed] [the] case for further 
proceedings consistent with [the Court's] opinion." kL. at 75, 305 P.3d at 519. 
On remand following the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion, the district court 
advised the parties it intended to conduct a new hearing to determine "whether 
or not at the time of trial M[r]. Hawkins was competent to proceed." (R., p.24.) 
Hawkins indicated he would like to retain private counsel to represent him in the 
new competency proceedings, and the court continued the matter to allow 
Hawkins that opportunity. (R., pp.24-25.) Attorney Eric Fredericksen 
subsequently filed a notice of appearance on Hawkins' behalf. (R., pp.88-89.) 
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On May 29, 2013, state filed a motion requesting the district court to 
take judicial notice of all prior proceedings in the case, 
and exhibits presented at the November 12, 2010 competency hearing. (R., 
pp.26-37.) Based on that testimony and the exhibits, as well as the underlying 
court record, the state asked the district court to "adopt its finding from its 
December 6, 2010 Order that [Hawkins] was retroactively competent to stand 
trial in January 2008." (R., p.29.) Alternatively, the state requested that, if the 
court granted Hawkins a new retroactive competency hearing, it "hold its 
December 6, 2010 finding, by clear and convincing evidence[,] that [Hawkins] 
was retroactively competent to stand trial in January 2008, [was] sufficient to shift 
the burden to [Hawkins] to refute that finding." (R., pp.29-30, 36.) 
The district court held a status conference on May 29, 2013, at which 
attorney Eric Fredericksen appeared on Hawkins' behalf. (See generally 5/29/13 
Tr.) During the status conference, the district court granted the state's request to 
take judicial notice of the prior proceedings, including the prior testimony of Dr. 
Estess and Dr. Sombke; advised the parties it would conduct a retroactive 
competency hearing but would apply a presumption, based on the evidence 
already presented at the November 12, 2010 competency hearing, that Hawkins 
was competent when he was tried in January 2008; and explained that Hawkins 
would be permitted the opportunity to rebut that presumption, including by 
subpoenaing and cross-examining Dr. Estess and by presenting his own expert 
or fact witnesses. (5/29/13 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.7, L.25, p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.18.) 
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The court set the matter for a retroactive competency hearing on August 29, 
2013. (5/29/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.20-22.) 
On June 6, 2013, Hawkins, through his retained counsel, filed a motion to 
declare himself a "needy person" for the purpose of obtaining funds to secure a 
psychological expert to evaluate him and testify on his behalf at the retroactive 
competency hearing. (R., pp.93-96; see also 6/17/13 Tr., p.128, L.19 - p.129, 
L.11.) The district court granted the motion, set the matter for a status 
conference on July 3, 2013, and instructed Hawkins' counsel to "direct any 
specific requests for services to [the] Court for prior approval." (R., p.99; see 
also6/17/13Tr., p.129, L.12-p.131, L.16.) 
On June 28, 2013, Hawkins' attorney filed a Motion To Withdraw As 
Counsel Of Record and an affidavit in support thereof, asserting as one of the 
bases for the motion that "[f]or reasons your affiant cannot disclose, Mr. Hawkins 
desires to move forward in this case without the representation of your affiant." 
(R., pp.101-05.) At the July 3, 2013 status conference, Hawkins confirmed his 
"desire to move forward in [the] case without Mr. Frederickson's [sic] 
representation," and he informed the court he would like to "proceed pro se." 
(7/3/13 Tr., p.9, L.20 - p.10, L.4.) The court expressed reluctance to grant 
Hawkins' request to represent himself, explaining: 
That kind of presents a conundrum for the court, or a 
conflict, because the focus of this hearing is that the argument that 
was presented by your attorneys in the appeal before the Court of 
Appeals that you were not competent to essentially stand for trial 
back in January of 2007 [sic], I believe in your - when your jury trial 
was held, okay? 
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And so that raises a question about your competency then, 
your competency since then, and your competency now, and so if 
someone is saying that they aren't competent, you can understand 
when they want to represent themselves that creates a real conflict 
in the court's way of looking at this thing. 
(7/3/13 Tr., p.10, Ls.5-19.) The court advised Hawkins that he had the right to 
have an attorney appointed at public expense (7/3/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-22). The 
court also advised Hawkins that, if he so desired, the court would appoint the 
public defender's office to represent him, either as primary counsel or as standby 
counsel. (7/3/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-24.) Hawkins insisted that he wished to 
represent himself. (7/3/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.18-24.) 
Faced with Hawkins' request to proceed pro se, the district court engaged 
Hawkins in an extensive Faretta1 inquiry. (7/3/13 Tr., p.12, L.25- p.28, L.8.) At 
the outset of that inquiry, the court asked Hawkins whether he was "under the 
care of any psychiatrist at [that] point in time," and whether he was "taking any 
sort of medications for any mental disease, defect, or malady." (7 /3/13 Tr., p.13, 
Ls.3-7, 9-11.) Hawkins responded, "No" to both questions. (7/3/13 Tr., p.13, 
Ls.8, 12.) The court then explained to Hawkins, in detail, the potential risks and 
disadvantages of representing himself, all of which Hawkins stated he 
understood. (7/3/13 Tr., p.13, L.13 - p.17, L.13.) The court repeatedly asked 
Hawkins why, with all the risks and disadvantages he faced, he wished to 
represent himself. (7/3/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-22, p.19, Ls.1-11, p.22, L.2 - p.23, 
L.5, p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.6, p.25, Ls.1-6, p.26, Ls.4-8.) Hawkins responded, 
variously, "I believe that the court and prosecution considers me competent, and 
1 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 
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I also know I'm entitled to represent myself" (7/3/13 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-8); "I believe 
it's best decision for me, for my defense" (7 /3/13 Ls. 7-8); "[T]his 
court has found me competent, prosecution believes me competent, this court 
has said they have made observations as to my competence, and with that, then 
I have a clear constitutional right to represent myself" (7/3/13 Tr., p.25, Ls.8-12); 
and "It's my constitutional right" (7/3/13 Tr., p.26, Ls.9-10). The court stated it 
"[did not] disagree" with Hawkins' assertion that the court and prosecution 
considered him competent, but it also advised Hawkins it was "prepared to hear 
evidence as to [his] lack of competency and prepared to rule that way if, in fact, 
the weight of the evidence" ultimately showed he was not competent at the time 
he was tried. (7/3/13 Tr., p.23, Ls.9-18.) Hawkins indicated he understood and, 
in response to further questioning by the court, continued to insist that he be 
permitted to represent himself. (7/3/13 Tr., p.23, L.19 - p.27, L.2.) The court 
ultimately granted Hawkins' request, allowed Mr. Fredericksen to withdraw, and 
appointed the public defender's office as standby counsel. (7/3/13 Tr., p.27, L.3 
- p.28, L.8; R., pp.169-70, 177-78; see also R., p.213 (unsigned written waiver of 
right to an attorney; 7/17/13 Tr., p.13, L.21 - p.17, L.12 (district court provided 
Hawkins with written waiver form, read it to him, and found, based on Hawkins' 
responses to questioning, that Hawkins' "waiver of counsel [was] knowingly, 
intelligently, [and] voluntarily made").) 
After his attorney was permitted to withdraw, Hawkins filed a number of 
pro se motions. (R., pp.107-59.) The district court acknowledged the filings at 
status conference on July 17, 2013, but deferred ruling on them pending its final 
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determination of whether Hawkins was competent to stand trial in January 2008. 
(7/17/13 , p.17, 13 - p.22, L.5.) The court inquired of Hawkins whether he 
had subpoenaed Dr. Estess for the August 29th competency hearing and 
whether he had subpoenaed and/or met with his own psychiatric expert. 
(7/17/13 Tr., p.22, L.5 - p.23, L.15.) Hawkins indicated he understood he was 
required to subpoena witnesses but he had not done so, and had not met with 
his chosen psychiatric expert, Dr. Robert Cloninger, because he had not 
received what he believed to be necessary discovery. (7/17/13 Tr., p.22, L.5 -
p.24, L.5.) The court ordered Hawkins' former attorney to provide Hawkins with 
copies of all discovery in his possession (7/17/13 Tr., p.26, L.13- p.27, L.17; R., 
pp.179-80), but it cautioned Hawkins that "discovery [was] not the critical issue" 
and would not be a basis to continue the August 29th competency hearing 
(7/17/13 Tr., p.28, L.15 - p.31, L.9). 
At a July 31, 2013 status conference, Hawkins advised the court he had 
communicated by e-mail with his chosen psychiatric expert, Dr. Cloninger, but he 
had not yet been evaluated because Dr. Cloninger was "awaiting verification of 
payment." (7/31/13 Tr., p.134, L.21 - p.136, L.21.) Upon further inquiry, 
Hawkins advised the court that Dr. Cloninger resided in St. Louis, Missouri, that 
his rate was $450 per hour and that, in the event he was required to appear in 
person to testify at the competency hearing, he would require additional 
compensation for airfare and lodging. (7/31/13 Tr., p.137, L.6 - p.138, L.8.) 
Finding the costs associated with retaining Dr. Cloninger were not reasonable, 
the court vacated the August 29th competency hearing and instructed Hawkins' 
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standby counsel to assist Hawkins in retaining a qualified psychiatrist within a 
500-mile radius of Boise, Idaho. (7/31/13 Tr., p.141, L.5 - p.142, L.16.) The 
court subsequently amended its order to require Hawkins to retain a qualified 
psychologist or psychiatrist who practiced within the Boise, Nampa, Caldwell or 
Twin Falls areas. (R., pp.230-31.) The court's written order further provided that 
Hawkins was to disclose the name of his expert by August 29, 2013, and was to 
submit to an examination by his expert within 30 days from the date of 
disclosure; failure to do either could result in Hawkins being precluded from 
presenting expert testimony at the retroactive competency hearing.2 (R., p.231.) 
Hawkins attempted to appeal from the court's order regarding the 
selection of his expert witness, but the appeal was dismissed. (R., p.261; 
10/17/13 Tr., p.4, Ls.12-19.) Following the dismissal, the court set a hearing for 
October 17, 2013, the purpose of which was "to select a psychologist/psychiatrist 
to evaluate the defendant and report to the Court." (R., p.261.) The notice of 
hearing also provided: "In the event the defendant does not submit in writing 
prior to the hearing his selection of a psychologist/psychiatrist the court then will 
make the selection." (R., p.261.) 
2 The court also noted in its written order that Hawkins had "filed numerous 
motions many of which are not germane to the sole issue before this court and 
that is the competency of the defendant during his jury trial." (R., p.230; see also 
R., pp. 187-212, 214-20, 223-27 (Hawkins' prose motions).) The court denied 
one of the motions - a motion to strike the testimony of Dr. Estess - but 
"suspended" the remaining motions pending the retroactive competency hearing. 
(R., p.230.) 
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It does not appear that Hawkins notified the court in writing before the 
1 yth hearing regarding his choice of a psychiatric expert. 3 
at the October 1 J1h hearing who it was that he wished to have evaluate him, 
Hawkins responded, "Dr. Robert Collinger [sic]." (10/17/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.8-20.) 
The court denied that request and, after Hawkins refused to submit the name of 
a different expert, indicated it would appoint Dr. Engle to conduct the evaluation. 
(10/17/13 Tr., p.5, L.21 - p.6, L.24.) Hawkins advised the court he would not 
submit to an evaluation by Dr. Engle and, after consulting with standby counsel, 
requested a seven-day continuance to "possibly" have standby counsel 
appointed as counsel of record. (10/17/13 Tr., p.6, L.25- p.10, L.15.) The court 
denied the request for a continuance but gave Hawkins additional time to confer 
with standby counsel and determine whether he wished to be represented. 
(10/17/13 Tr., p.10, L.25 - p.11, L.14.) Before recessing, the court gave 
Hawkins three options: 
[l]f Mr. Cahill is going to be your counsel, I'll give him an opportunity 
to go out in the community, find a psychiatrist or psychologist and 
testify on your behalf. And that's not going to be revokable [sic] on 
your part. He is going to be your counsel. 
Or Option 2, is that you submit to Dr. Engle's evaluation .... 
Or Option 3, if you decline to submit to an evaluation by Dr. 
Engle, the court then will sentence you here forthwith today. Those 
are your three options. 
(10/17/13Tr., p.11, L.15-p.12, L.6.) 
3 In a document entitled "Notice of Defenses Psychiatrist[;] Motion for Payment to 
Psychiatrist," Hawkins identified Dr. Cloninger as his chosen psychiatric expert. 
(R., pp.271-74.) It appears Hawkins signed and mailed the notice on October 
11, 2013 (R., pp.273-74), but it was not filed with the court until October 21, 2013 
(R., p.271). 
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At the conclusion of the recess, Hawkins indicated he would like standby 
counsel to represent him, but also suggested his parents may able to 
privately retain Dr. Cloninger. (10/17/13 Tr., p.12, L.15 - p.14, L.6.) The court 
advised Hawkins it would be "an entirely different matter" if he could privately 
retain Dr. Cloninger but, until the court had "appropriate documentation, including 
financial commitments from [Hawkins'] parents," the court was "not going to 
proceed down that path." (10/17/13 Tr., p.13, Ls.9-18.) The court also advised 
Hawkins that, if he wanted standby counsel to represent him, standby counsel 
would be his lawyer and would "take whatever steps [were] necessary to obtain 
an evaluation of [Hawkins] to determine whether or not [he] [was] competent 
during [his] jury trial," and Hawkins would not be permitted to "fire him." 
(10/17/13 Tr., p.14, L.7 - p.15, L.1.) After again being advised that his choices 
were to unconditionally accept counsel's representation, or submit to an 
evaluation by Dr. Engle, or be sentenced forthwith, Hawkins told the court, "Then 
you should just sentence me today, then. That's what you should do." (10/17/13 
Tr., p.15, Ls.2-19.) 
After ascertaining from standby counsel that counsel "did not have any 
trouble" communicating with Hawkins during the "brief discussions" counsel had 
had with him (10/17/13 Tr., p.15, L.20 - p.16, L.23), and after ascertaining from 
Hawkins himself that he was not taking psychotropic medications (10/17/13 Tr., 
p.16, L.24 - p.17, L.17), the court made the following findings: 
[T]he court will find from the totality of the record that Mr. Hawkins, 
particularly in light of the extensive motions that he has filed since 
this was submitted back to the court in April of this year - that Mr. 
Hawkins is competent, and he understands the nature of the 
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proceeding, that he has made a decision, and I find him to have 
made a knowing and intelligent decision to continue to insist that a 
psychiatrist from St. Louis, Missouri, be appointed to testify on his 
behalf for his articulated basis for not appointing that psychiatrist, 
that there have been numerous delays caused as a result of again 
Mr. Hawkins['] - failure to follow through with the court's specific 
order. The court will find that there has been ample opportunity 
afforded to Mr. Hawkins to present evidence to the court regarding 
his mental status at his trial in 2007 [sic]. 
The court will find that the testimony and evidence 
presented to the court by Dr. Estess that Mr. Hawkins was 
competent to stand trial, that he was at the time of his evaluation by 
both Dr. Sombke and Dr. Estess was capable of understanding the 
proceedings, assisting in his defense, and that that remains the 
case today. 
(10/17/13 Tr., p.18, L.16-p.19, L.20 (Hawkins' interjections omitted).) The court 
therefore reimposed the judgment and Hawkins' unified sentence of life with 30 
years fixed. (10/17/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.4-6, 8-12; R., pp.280-84.) 
Hawkins timely appealed from the amended judgment. (R., pp.285-94.) 
12 
ISSUES 
Hawkins states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Did the 2010 retroactive determination that Mr. Hawkins was 
competent in January of 2008 violate due process? 
B. In the alternative, should this case be remanded for a 
determination of whether, given the Supreme Court decision in 
Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008), Mr. Hawkins was 
competent to waive his right to counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p.18.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Hawkins failed to show error in the district court's retroactive 
competency determination? 
2. Has Hawkins failed to show the district court abused its discretion by 
allowing him to exercise his constitutional right to self-representation? 
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Hawkins Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Retroactive 
Determination That Hawkins Was Competent When He Was Tried In 2008 
A. Introduction 
On remand following the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in State v. 
Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 229 P.3d 379 (Ct. App. 2009), the district court ordered 
Hawkins to undergo a competency evaluation pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-211 and 18-
212. (#38532 R., pp.29-30, 34-36, 39.) Hawkins was evaluated by two different 
mental health professionals, licensed psychologist Dr. Chad Sombke and 
licensed psychiatrist Dr. Michael Estess. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.9, L.14- p.12, 
L.15, p.59, L.22 - p.60, L.18, p.67, L.18 - p.68, L.19; #38532 State's Exhibits 5 
and 6.) At an evidentiary hearing on the competency issue, both doctors opined, 
based on their interactions with Hawkins, his responses to testing, and other 
collateral information regarding Hawkins' social and institutional history, that 
Hawkins was presently competent to stand trial. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.16, L.6 
- p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2 - p.54, L.2, p.68, L.20 - p.95, L.3.) Specifically, Dr. 
Sombke testified that Hawkins was neither delusional nor psychotic; he was 
competent, understood the proceedings against him and was capable of 
assisting in his own defense. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.28, L.16-p.46, L.5, p.53, 
L.2 - p.56, L.13.) Dr. Estess likewise testified that Hawkins was "perfectly 
competent" to stand trial, that "he [was] not psychotic and not delusional," and 
that there was "nothing about him ... that would preclude his ability to confer with 
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his attorney in his own defense or to understand the nature and circumstances of 
legal difficulties." (#38532 11/12/10 , p.91, L.24 - p.95, L.3.) 
Dr. testified that he and his staff had numerous prior 
contacts with Hawkins during the two-year period he was housed in the Ada 
County Jail pending his trial in 2008. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.63, 
L.25.) Between 2006 and 2008, neither Dr. Estess, his staff, nor jail staff 
believed that Hawkins suffered from any mental illness. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., 
p.64, L.14 - p.67, L.17.) Dr. Estess characterized Hawkins as "arrogant[,] 
narcissi[stic], paranoid, inadequate, dependent, dishonest, antisocial ... angry, 
petulant, manipulative, deceitful, and dishonest, and coy." (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., 
p.65, Ls.16-22.) He opined, however, that at the time he was tried in January 
2008, Hawkins "was perfectly competent to understand the nature of the 
proceedings, to confer with an attorney in his own defense and understand what 
was going on. . .. [B]asically, ... he was competent to stand trial." (#38532 
11/12/10 Tr., p.99, L.18-p.100, L.19.) 
Based on the totality of the evidence presented to it, "including the 
admitted exhibits and testimony presented during the competency hearing," the 
district court found in its December 6, 2010 Order Regarding Defendant's 
Competence that Hawkins "is able to assist in his own defense and is capable of 
understanding [the] nature of the proceedings" and was therefore presently 
competent to stand trial. (#38532 R., p.135.) The court also found by clear and 
convincing evidence that Hawkins "understood the nature of the proceedings 
against him and was able to assist in his own defense at the time he went to trial 
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in this case in January 2008" and, thus, made the retroactive finding that 
Hawkins was competent during the 2008 trial. (#38532 R., pp.135-36.) The 
court subsequently adopted that finding in the proceedings that occurred on 
remand following the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Hawkins, 155 
Idaho 69, 305 P.3d 513 (2013). (5/29/13 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.7, L.25, p.10, L.20 -
p.11, L.18; 10/17/13 Tr., p.19, Ls.14-20.) 
On appeal, Hawkins argues that "the district court erred in determining in 
2010 that [he] was retrospectively competent throughout his trial in January of 
2008." (Appellant's brief, p.18 (capitalization altered, italics omitted).) 
Specifically, he asks this Court to find, as a matter of first impression in Idaho, 
that retrospective competency determinations made more than one year after 
trial do not comport with due process and are therefore impermissible as a 
matter of law. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) Alternatively, he contends that a 
retroactive determination of his competency to stand trial in 2008 is not possible 
"based on the circumstance[s] and facts presented in his case." (Appellant's 
brief, p.20.) Neither argument withstands scrutiny when viewed in light of the 
weight of relevant authority and the facts of this case. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"[C]onstitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court 
exercises free review." Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, _, 321 P.3d 709, 714 
(2014) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A trial court's determination 
that a defendant was competent to stand trial will not be disturbed on appeal if 
supported by substantial, competent evidence. State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 
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63, 90 P.3d 278, 288 (2003) (citing State v. Daniel, 127 Idaho 801, 803, 907 
P.2d 119, 121 (Ct App. 1995); State v. Potter, 109 Idaho 967, 970, 2 P.2d 
668, 671 (Ct. App. 1985)). 
C. This Court Should Decline To Adopt A Bright-Line Rule That 
Retrospective Competency Determinations, Made More Than One Year 
After The Defendant Was Tried, Are Per Se Impermissible 
Due process prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not 
mentally competent to stand trial. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 169-70 
(2008). Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171-72 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 
U.S. 375, 385 (1966); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62, 90 P.3d 278, 287 
(2003). Under a due process analysis, the test for determining competency is 
whether the defendant "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer 
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding - and whether he has a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Dusky 
v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Accord Edwards, 554 U.S. at 170; Drape, 
420 U.S. at 172; Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 62, 90 P.3d at 287; State v. Powers, 96 
Idaho 833, 843, 537 P.2d 1369, 1379 (1975). In Idaho, the right of a defendant 
to be free from prosecution while mentally incompetent is safeguarded by I.C. §§ 
18-21 O and 18-211 which, together, require the trial court to order a competency 
evaluation whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's "capacity to 
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense." 
"[T]he failure to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant's 
right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent to stand trial deprives him of 
his due process right to a fair trial." Drape, 362 U.S. at 172 (citing Pate, 383 U.S. 
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375). If such a violation occurs, the question becomes whether an adequate 
hearing can be held determine the defendant's competency at the time of his 
trial. Drape, 362 U.S. at 183; Wheat v. Thigpen, 793 F.2d 621, 630 (5th Cir. 
1986). 
Idaho's appellate courts have never considered whether retrospective 
competency determinations are permissible. However, as recognized by the 
Idaho Supreme Court, "retroactive competency determinations are allowed in 
many jurisdictions under certain circumstances." State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 
69, 73, 305 P.3d 513, 517 (2013) (and cases cited therein). Indeed, numerous 
other courts that have considered the issue have held that such determinations 
"are permissible whenever a court can conduct a meaningful hearing to evaluate 
retrospectively the competency of the defendant." Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 
690, 696 (9th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted), superseded QY statute on other 
grounds as stated in Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2000); see also 
United States v. Duncan, 643 F.3d 1242, 1250 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Odle 
v. Woodford, 238 F.3d 1084, 1089 (9th Cir. 2001) (trial court's failure to hold a 
competency hearing at the time of trial can be cured by holding a retrospective 
competency hearing "when the record contains sufficient information upon which 
to base a reasonable psychiatric judgment")); United States v. Auen, 846 F.2d 
872, 878 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he district court is in the best position to determine 
whether it can make a retrospective determination of competency."); United 
States v. Renfroe, 825 F.2d 763, 767-68 (3 rd Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. 
Mason, 52 F.3d 1286 (4th Cir. 1995) (same); Wheat, 793 F.2d at 630 (upholding 
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retroactive competency determination where the evidence allowed for a 
meaningful retrospective hearing and established defendant's competence 
time of trial); Galowski v. Berge, 78 F.3d 1176, 1180-82 (ih Cir. 1996) (same); 
Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802 (8 th Cir. 1996) (meaningful retroactive 
competency determination possible where "the state of the record, together with 
such additional evidence as may be relevant and available, permits an accurate 
assessment of the defendant's condition at the time"); Clayton v. Gibson, 199 
F.3d 1162, 1168-72 (10th Cir. 1999) (same); Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282, 
1286-87 n.6 (11 th Cir. 1996) ("nunc pro tune competency hearing [possible], so 
long as a reliable inquiry into the defendant's competency can still be made"); 
accord Newman v. Harrington, 726 F.3d 921, 929 (ih Cir. 2013); Blakeney v. 
United States, 77 A.3d 328, 349-50 (D.C. 2013); Hooker v. United States, 70 
A.3d 1197, 1202 (D.C. 2013); State v. Ashe, 748 S.E.2d 610,615 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2013); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 56 S.W.3d 406, 409 (Ky. 2001 ), overruled 
in part on other grounds .QY Padgett v. Commonwealth, 312 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 
2010); State v. Johnson, 395 N.W.2d 176, 184-85 (Wis. 1986); State v. Sanders, 
549 S.E.2d 40, 53-55 (W.Va. 2001); Commonwealth v. Santiago, 855 A.2d 682, 
694 (Pa. 2004); Tate v. State, 896 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Ok. 1995); Montana v. 
Bostwick, 988 P .2d 765, 772-73 (Mont. 1999). 
Hawkins appears to recognize that retrospective competency 
determinations are permissible in certain circumstances. (See Appellant's brief, 
p.20 ("In the rare case where less than a year has passed since the trial, the 
determination of whether a retroactive competency hearing is possible could be 
19 
made on a case-by-case basis.").) Nevertheless, he asks this Court to hold that 
retroactive competency determinations made more than one year after the 
defendant was tried are inadequate, as a matter of law, to satisfy the 
requirements of due process. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) In support of his 
argument, Hawkins relies on Dusky, Pate and Drape, supra, noting that, in each 
case, the United States Supreme Court emphasized the inherent difficulties 
associated with retrospectively determining a defendant's competence and, in 
each case, the Court declined to remand for a retrospective competency 
determination more than one year after the defendant had been tried. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.19-20.) 
Hawkins' reliance on Dusky, Pate and Drape for a bright-line rule 
prohibiting retrospective competency determinations due the passage of time is 
misplaced. None of those cases hold that such determinations are impossible. 
In fact, the state is unaware of any case, and Hawkins has cited none, that has 
interpreted the Supreme Court's opinions in Dusky, Pate and Drope as holding 
that retrospective competency determinations, made more than one year after 
the defendant was tried, are impermissible as a matter of law. Rather, as set 
forth above, courts that have considered the issue nearly universally hold that, 
while such determinations may be difficult, they are permissible when the trial 
court has sufficient information to make a reliable determination of the 
defendant's competency at the time he or she was tried. See, ~. Odle, 238 
F.3d at 1089-90 (passage of "many years since Odle was convicted" did not 
preclude trial court from making retrospective competency determination based 
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on "old and new evidence" pertaining directly to Odie's competency at the time 
was tried); Wheat, 793 F.2d at 630 (Fifth Circuit, though "acutely aware of the 
hazards connected with retrospective competency hearings," nevertheless "has 
repeatedly sanctioned nunc pro tune proceedings where there is sufficient data 
available to guarantee reliability") (citations omitted); People v. Ary, 246 P.3d 
322, 329 (Cal. 2011) (and cases cited therein) ("majority of courts that have 
considered this issue agree" that failure to hold a competency hearing at the time 
of trial can be cured retroactively). 
Whether a trial court can conduct a meaningful and reliable retrospective 
competency hearing is best assessed on a case-by-case basis, not as a matter 
of law. State v. Snyder, 750 So.2d 832, 855 (La. 1999) (citing Miller v. Dugger, 
838 F.2d 1530 (11 th Cir. 1988)). The passage of time since the defendant's 
conviction, though relevant, "is not an insurmountable obstacle if sufficient 
contemporaneous information is available" and "permits an accurate assessment 
of the defendant's condition at the time of the original state proceedings." 
Snyder, 750 So.2d at 855 (citing Reynolds v. Norris, 86 F.3d 796, 802-03 (8th Cir. 
1996)); see also Odle, 238 F.3d at 1089-90. Factors bearing on whether a 
meaningful retrospective competency determination is possible include, but are 
not limited to, "the existence of contemporaneous medical evidence, the 
recollections of non-experts who had the opportunity to interact with the 
defendant during the relevant period, statements by the defendant in the trial 
transcript, and the existence of medical records." Snyder, 750 So.2d at 855; see 
also McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946, 962-63 (10th Cir. 2001) (listing similar 
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factors and passage of time as relevant considerations in assessment of whether 
retrospective competency determination is possible). Ultimately, it is the trial 
court who is in the best position to determine whether the evidence before it 
permits a meaningful retrospective determination of the defendant's competence 
to stand trial. kl (citing Renfroe, 825 F.2d at 767). 
Hawkins asks this Court to adopt a bright-line rule prohibiting retrospective 
competency determinations in cases where it has been more than one year 
since the defendant was tried, but he has not cited any authority for the 
proposition that such determinations are per se impermissible; and, as 
demonstrated above, the weight of authority actually suggests the opposite. 
Because the question of whether such determinations are possible will 
necessarily depend on the facts of each case, this Court should reject Hawkins' 
invitation to adopt a bright-line rule and instead hold, consistent with prevailing 
authority, that such determinations are permissible whenever the trial court has 
sufficient information to make a reliable determination of the defendant's 
competency at the time of trial. 
D. Hawkins Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Retrospective 
Determination That Hawkins Was Competent To Be Tried In 2008 
As an alternative to his argument that retrospective competency 
determinations made more than one year after trial are impermissible as a 
matter of law, Hawkins asks this Court to find that such a determination is not 
possible based on the facts and circumstances of this case. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.20-21.) In advancing this argument, Hawkins fails to recognize that courts 
consider a number of factors in determining whether a retrospective competency 
determination is in case. McGregor v. Gibson, 
248 F.3d 946, 962-63 (10th Cir. 2001) (and factors cited therein - including (1) 
passage of time, (2) availability of contemporaneous medical evidence, (3) 
statements by defendant in trial record, and (4) availability of individuals who 
were in position to interact with defendant before and during trial). With the 
exception of the passage of time, Hawkins utterly ignores these factors and the 
evidence on remand that supports the district court's retroactive finding that 
Hawkins was competent when he was tried in January 2008. 
After the Court of Appeals vacated Hawkins' convictions, Hawkins was 
evaluated by two mental health experts, both of whom testified at a January 
2010 competency hearing that Hawkins was then presently competent to be 
tried. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.16, L.6 - p.46, L.5, p.53, L.2 - p.54, L.2, p.68, 
L.20 - p.95, L.3.) Dr. Sombke had originally opined that Hawkins was delusional 
(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.19, L.16 - p.20, L.13; #38532 State's Exhibit 6), but he 
changed his opinion after reviewing a wealth of collateral information that was 
not available to him when he made his initial diagnosis (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., 
p.20, L.14 - p.29, L. 10). Included among that information were letters Hawkins 
had written to his parents while in jail, a report on Hawkins' psychological 
condition prepared by Dr. Michael Johnston in March 2008, and a 2006 
psychological evaluation of Hawkins' wife, Darcy. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.20, 
L.14 - p.28, L.15; #38532 State's Exhibits 1, 3, 4.) After reviewing that 
information, all of which was admitted at the November 2010 competency 
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hearing, and conferring with Dr. Estess, Dr. Sombke concluded that Hawkins has 
"always had" the capacity to understand the proceedings against him (#38532 
11/12/10 Tr., p.29, L.11-16), and that "he has the capacity to participate 
meaningfully in his defense with an attorney" but "he just choses [sicJ not to do 
that" (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.29, L.17 - p.30, L.14). Dr. Sombke explained that, 
in his view, the "main issue" he had to decide was whether Hawkins was 
delusional. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.30, Ls.19-22.) While Hawkins initially 
presented to Dr. Sombke as delusional based on Hawkins' insistence that he 
was affiliated with and committed his crimes at the direction of covert 
governmental agencies, that portrayal was ultimately not borne out by any of the 
collateral information Dr. Sombke reviewed. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.30, L.23 -
p.32, L.5, p.33, L.2 - p.35, L.5.) Dr. Sombke explained: 
[l]f somebody holds a delusion for that fixed and for that period of 
time, where he says it's been 20 years or more, that delusion would 
permeate his life throughout all segments of his life, where it 
wouldn't be just compartmentalized right when he talks in court or 
whatever. It would be part of his life. 
And reviewing the collateral information from the prison and 
the other evaluations I saw, I saw almost no references to the 
C.I.A., the D.l.A., or government agencies. It wasn't present in 
what Mr. Hawkins was telling other people. So it was just - it was 
just not consistent with the true delusional disorder that would have 
been in those other conversations. 
He changed his story a lot in the other information that I was 
- the collateral information. There was a lot of changes about his 
stories, with his history, and with his wife, and all that. 
And all that information leads me to believe that he's not 
delusional. And I think a lot of this stuff are stories that he is just 
telling people to try to benefit his current situation. 
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(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.31, L.6 - p.32, L.5.) Ultimately, Dr. Sombke 
characterized Hawkins as manipulative and potentially obsessive-compulsive 
(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.32, Ls.6-8, p.34, L.8 - p.35, L.5); but opined that 
Hawkins is neither delusional nor psychotic (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.37, L.4 -
p.38, L.15) and is competent to stand trial (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.29, Ls.3-10). 
Dr. Estess also evaluated Hawkins' competency and, in doing so, 
reviewed much of the same collateral information relied on by Dr. Sombke. 
(#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.67, L.18 - p.72, L.2; #38532 State's Exhibit 5.) Unlike 
Dr. Sombke, however, Dr. Estess was already familiar with Hawkins because he 
and his staff had numerous prior contacts with Hawkins during the two-year 
period he was housed in the Ada County Jail pending his trial in 2008. (#38532 
11/12/10 Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.63, L.25.) Between 2006 and 2008, Dr. Estess had 
many discussions with his staff and the jail security officers about Hawkins' 
mental condition. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.63, Ls.19-25.) Dr. Estess prescribed 
Prozac to Hawkins for depression, but Hawkins did not require any other mental 
health treatment, and neither Dr. Estess nor his staff nor jail staff believed that 
Hawkins suffered from any mental illness at the time. (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., 
p.64, L.1 - p.65, L.4, p.67, Ls.6-12.) Dr. Estess characterized Hawkins as "a 
very arrogant narcissi, paranoid, inadequate, dependent, dishonest, antisocial 
character. And an angry, petulant, manipulative, deceitful, and dishonest and 
coy - thinks more of his intelligence than he has, and presents himself in that 
smart-aleck kind of sarcastic, pseudo fashion." (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.65, 
Ls.16-22; see also p.67, Ls.6-10 ("[E]veryone came to the conclusion about 
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when they interacted with Mr. Hawkins is that he was a manipulative, dishonest, 
obsessive-compulsive, paranoid character who was not mentally ill.").) 
on his prior interactions with Hawkins and his comprehensive review of other 
information bearing on Hawkins' competency - including the trial transcripts and 
information pertaining to Hawkins' prior social, institutional and mental health 
history (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.70, L.5 - p.72, L2, p.74, L.8 - p.75, L.21) - Dr. 
Estess opined "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that Hawkins was 
not only presently competent at the time of the November 2010 competency 
hearing (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.91, L.24- p.92, L19), but he was also "perfectly 
competent" when he stood trial in January 2008 (#38532 11/12/10 Tr., p.99, L.18 
-p.100, L.13). 
Based on the totality of the evidence presented to it, "including the 
admitted exhibits and testimony presented during the competency hearing," the 
district court found by clear and convincing evidence that Hawkins "understood 
the nature of the proceedings against him and was able to assist in his own 
defense at the time he went to trial in this case in January 2008" and, thus, made 
the retroactive finding that Hawkins was competent during the 2008 trial. 
(#38532 R., pp.135-36.) Hawkins does not directly challenge the district court's 
finding, or any of the evidence on which it was based, but instead argues only 
that the passage of 34 months between his trial and the district court's 
retrospective competency determination "is too long per se for a retrospective 
competence evaluation, especially considering the fluid nature of mental illness." 
(Appellant's brief, p.21.) Hawkins' argument is just a reiteration of his claim that, 
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because retroactive competency determinations made more than one year after 
a defendant tried are difficult, such determinations are impermissible. 
(Compare Respondent's brief, pp.19-20 pp.20-21.) This argument fails for 
the reasons already set forth in Section I.C., supra, and Hawkins has otherwise 
failed to show any error by the district court. 
As previously explained, the passage of time since a defendant's 
conviction "is not an insurmountable obstacle" to a retrospective competency 
determination so long as "sufficient contemporaneous information is available" to 
permit an reliable assessment of the defendant's mental condition at the time of 
trial. State v. Snyder, 750 So.2d 832, 855 (La. 1999) (citing Reynolds v. Norris, 
86 F.3d 796, 802-03 (8th Cir. 1996)); see also Odle, 238 F.3d at 1089-90. The 
information available to the district court in this case included contemporaneous 
medical evidence - including a March 2008 psychological evaluation (#38532 
State's Exhibit 3) - the trial transcript, and the observations and opinions of two 
mental health experts, one of whom personally interacted and supervised others 
who personally interacted with Hawkins before and during his 2008 trial. See, 
~' McGregor, 248 F.3d at 962-63 (factors to be considered in retrospective 
competency determination include availability of contemporaneous medical 
evidence, statements by defendant in trial record, and availability of individuals 
who were in position to interact with defendant before and during trial). It should 
also be noted that the district judge who made the retrospective competency 
determination is the same judge who presided over Hawkins' trial and who 
observed then that it had never had cause to believe that Hawkins lacked the 
mental capacity to understand the proceedings or to assist in his own defense. 
(#35281 Trial Tr., p.1120, L.15- p.1121, L.2.) Taken together, this information 
was sufficient to support the district court's retroactive determination that 
Hawkins was mentally competent during his 2008 trial. Hawkins has failed to 
show error in the district court's retrospective competency determination. 
II. 
Hawkins Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Allowing Him To Exercise His Constitutional Right To Self-Representation 
A. Introduction 
Hawkins was represented by counsel and had the opportunity to cross-
examine the state's witnesses and present his own evidence at the November 
12, 2010 competency hearing. (See generally #38532 11/12/10 Tr.) 
Nevertheless, on remand from the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion that held the 
law of the case doctrine did not prevent the district court from making a 
retroactive competency determination, the district court scheduled a second 
competency hearing so that Hawkins would have yet another opportunity to 
cross-examine the state's witnesses and present his own psychiatric expert. 
(5/29/13 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.7, L.25, p.9, Ls.20-22, p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.18.) 
Hawkins initially retained counsel to represent him in the retroactive competency 
proceedings4 (R., pp.88-89), but he later fired counsel and insisted on 
proceeding pro se (R., pp.101-05; see generally 7/3/13 Tr.). Following an 
4 As used from this point forward in the state's briefing, the phrase "retroactive 
competency proceedings" refers, generally, to the proceedings on remand 
following the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Hawkins, 155 Idaho 69, 
305 P.3d 513 (2013). 
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extensive Faretta inquiry, during which the court indicated a belief that Hawkins 
was mentally competent (7/3/13 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-9), the court found 
"waiver of counsel [was] knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily made" and 
therefore granted Hawkins' request to proceed prose (7/3/13 Tr., p.10, L.1 -
p.28, L.8; 7/17/13 Tr., p.13, L.21-p.17, L.12). 
Despite having insisted below that he had a constitutional right to 
represent himself in the retroactive competency proceedings, Hawkins now 
argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion by permitting him to 
exercise that right. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-25.) Specifically, he argues the 
court reached its decision without considering whether he was mentally 
competent to waive his right to counsel as contemplated by Indiana v. Edwards, 
554 U.S. 164 (2008). Hawkins' argument fails because it is premised on a 
misunderstanding of both the law and the facts of this case. Correct application 
of the law to the facts shows no abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a trial court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the 
lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the 
lower court acted within the bounds of such discretion and consistently with any 
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the 
lower reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Ruperd, 146 Idaho 
742, 743, 202 P.3d 1228, 1289 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 
Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)). 
29 
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Allowing Hawkins To 
Exercise His Constitutional Right To Represent Himself During The 
Retroactive Competency Proceedings 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, 
section 13, of the Idaho Constitution both guarantee criminal defendants the right 
to self-representation. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975); State v. 
Folk, 151 Idaho 327, 339, 256 P.3d 735, 747 (2011); State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 
879, 885, 136 P.3d 350, 356 (Ct. App. 2006). The right of self-representation, 
however, is not absolute. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth App. 
Dist., 528 U.S. 142, 161-62 (2000); State v. Reber, 138 Idaho 725, 277, 61 P.3d 
632, 634 (Ct. App. 2002). "Because the right to counsel is also guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment, . . . a defendant may waive the right to counsel and 
proceed at trial pro se 'only if the waiver is knowing, intelligent and voluntary."' 
United States v. DeShazer, 554 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); 
accord Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 860, 865, 781 
P.2d 197, 202 (1989); Averett, 142 Idaho at 885, 136 P.3d at 356. In addition, 
the United States Supreme Court recently held in Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 
164, 177-78 (2008), that when dealing with defendants whose mental 
competency is in question, "the Constitution permits States to insist upon 
representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial under Dusky 
[v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)] but who still suffer from severe mental 
illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by 
themselves." Edwards did not adopt a specific standard for measuring a 
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defendant's ability to carry out the basic tasks necessary for self-representation 
but recognized instead that the trial judge "will often prove best to make 
more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized 
circumstances of a particular defendant." Edwards, 554 U.S. at 177-78. 
On appeal, Hawkins does not challenge the district court's finding that he 
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel, as required by 
Faretta. Nor does he argue that, at the time of the retroactive competency 
proceedings, he lacked the requisite mental capacity under Dusky to understand 
the proceedings and assist in his defense. Rather, Hawkins argues the district 
court should not have permitted him to exercise his constitutional right to 
represent himself in the retroactive competency proceedings without first 
considering Edwards and making a specific finding that he was not only 
competent under the Dusky standard, but was also competent to carry out the 
basic tasks necessary to conduct his own defense. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-25.) 
Hawkins apparently believes that, because Edwards was not decided until June 
2008 - five months after his January 2008 jury trial - "it never occurred to the 
trial court that there might be a standard other than Faretta to apply to Mr. 
Hawkins's request to proceed pro se" in the 2013 retroactive competency 
proceedings. (Appellant's brief, pp.22-23.) He also appears to contend that 
Edwards actually mandates a higher standard of competency for those who 
represent themselves than for those who are represented by counsel. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.20-25.) Hawkins' arguments are without factual or legal 
merit. 
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Unlike the trial court in United States v. Ferguson, 560 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 
2009), relied on by Hawkins, the district court in this case clearly had benefit 
of the Edwards opinion in deciding whether to grant Hawkins' request to proceed 
pro se. That the court did not specifically cite Edwards or make an explicit 
finding that Hawkins was competent to carry out the basic tasks necessary to 
conduct his own defense before allowing Hawkins to exercise his constitutional 
right to self-representation in the retroactive competency proceedings does not 
show an abuse of discretion. As even the Ferguson court recognized, "Edwards 
does not compel a trial court to deny a defendant the exercise of his or her right 
to self-representation; it simply permits a trial court to require representation for a 
defendant who lacks mental competency to conduct trial proceedings." 
Ferguson, 560 F.3d at 1070 n.6 (emphasis original) (citing DeShazer, 554 F.3d 
1281, 1290 (10th Cir. 2009)); see also Panetti v. Stephens, 727 F.3d 398, 414 
(5th Cir. 2013) ("Edwards is permissive," allowing but not requiring the state to 
insist on counsel "in the 'exceptional' situation where a defendant is found 
competent to stand trial and elects to appear pro se, but is so severely mentally 
ill that his self-representation threatens an improper conviction." (footnotes 
omitted)); United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 385 (th Cir. 2009) ("The Constitution 
may have allowed the trial judge to block [the defendant's] request to go it alone, 
but it certainly didn't require it." (emphasis original) (citation omitted)); People v. 
Taylor, 220 P.3d 872 (Cal. 2009) ("Edwards did not hold ... that due process 
mandates a higher standard of mental competence for self-representation than 
for trial with counsel"; rather, it "held only that states may, without running afoul 
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of Faretta, impose a higher standard." (emphasis original)). Because it is 
undisputed both that Hawkins was competent under the Dusky 
participate in the retroactive competency proceedings and that he knowingly, 
voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel as required by Faretta, the 
district court was not required to conduct any further inquiry before permitting 
Hawkins to exercise his right to self-representation. 
The reasoning of United States v. Berry, supra, is particularly instructive. 
Berry was charged with wire fraud and "insisted on representing himself at trial." 
Berry, 565 F.3d at 386. On appeal from his conviction, Berry challenged the trial 
court's decision to allow him to proceed pro se. See ~ at 387 ("Berry chose to 
represent himself at trial, and now he contends the court should have prohibited 
that."). Like Hawkins, Berry argued the trial court believed he "had an 'absolute 
right' to represent himself .... so long as he was competent to stand trial." ~ 
And, like Hawkins, Berry argued that, in light of Edwards, "that view is 
constitutionally flawed." ~ The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Berry's 
argument, reasoning: 
The Court's decision in Edwards may help Berry in some 
abstract way, but even then not by much. Building on Godinez [v. 
Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993)], the Edwards Court took another step 
towards limiting the right of self-representation. The Court made it 
clear that the right to proceed pro se is anything but absolute. 
However, in both Godinez and Edwards the Court talked about 
what the Constitution permits - limitation of the self-representation 
right in connection with pleading guilty and presenting a trial 
defense, respectively - not what it mandates. At some point, 
presumably, there must be limits to the limitations. If the option to 
represent oneself is to be called a "right," not just a sometimes 
privilege, it has to be available in the usual course of things. 
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Berry, 565 F.3d at 391 (emphasis original). Ultimately, the court concluded that 
"the upshot for [was] Constitution have the trial 
judge to block his request to go it alone, but it certainly didn't require it." kl 
(emphasis original). 
The Berry court further reasoned that, even if it "were to read Edwards to 
require counsel in certain cases" - a reading the court characterized as 
"dubious" - such requirement would not apply in Berry's case because, by its 
terms, the Edwards rule that permits a trial court to limit a defendant's right of 
self-representation applies only "when the defendant is suffering from a 'severe 
mental illness."' Berry, 565 F.3d at 391. "Because there was no evidence before 
the trial court showing that Berry had such an affliction, Edwards was simply off 
the table." kl 
The reasoning and result of Berry apply with equal force to the facts of 
this case. Hawkins argues the trial court should not have permitted him to 
represent himself during the retrospective competency proceedings without first 
considering Edwards and determining whether he was mentally competent to do 
so. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-25.) As explained by the court in Berry, however, 
nothing in Edwards required the trial court to undertake such an inquiry where it 
was not then, and is not now, genuinely disputed that Hawkins otherwise 
possessed the mental wherewithal necessary to stand trial under Dusky and that 
he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to counsel as required 
by Faretta. 
Moreover, even if Edwards could interpreted as requiring the 
for defendants enough stand trial under 
Dusky but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are 
not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves," Edwards, 554 U.S. at 
178, the district court would not have been bound by such requirement in this 
case because there was no evidence that Hawkins was severely mentally ill. 
This is not a case like Ferguson, supra, where the court repeatedly expressed 
concern about the defendant's mental capacity to represent himself but felt 
constrained by pre-Edwards precedent to allow the defendant - who was 
otherwise competent to stand trial - to proceed prose. See Ferguson, 560 F.3d 
at 1062-64. To the contrary, by the time the court conducted the retroactive 
competency proceedings in this case the only evidence before it was that 
Hawkins did not suffer from any mental illness. (See generally #38532 11/12/10 
Tr.; 5/29/13 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-25, p.10, L.20 - p.11, L.18.) Although the court was 
prepared to make a contrary finding if the weight of the evidence presented at 
new competency hearing supported it, both at the time Hawkins expressed a 
desire to represent himself and throughout the remainder of the retroactive 
competency proceedings, the court had no misgivings about Hawkins' mental 
competence. (7/3/13 Tr., p.23, Ls.6-18; 10/17/13 Tr., p.19, Ls.14-20.) Thus, for 
Hawkins, like Berry, "Edwards was simply off the table." Berry, 565 F.3d at 391. 
Hawkins has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The respectfully requests this Court 
judgment of conviction. 
DATED this 5th day of October 2014. 
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